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Abstract 
Incorporation of radio controller units into heavy equipment used in the electricity industry provides 
numerous advantages including: improved electrical isolation between plant and operator, ability to 
incorporate an additional remote operator, and reductions in vehicle wiring and hydraulic hoses for 
equipment control. However, secure operation of vehicles and plant incorporating radio control rely on 
establishing suitable levels of immunity to possible radio frequency interference. Interference levels in 
close proximity to high voltage power lines are of special concern to the electricity industry. This paper 
reports on a preliminary investigation into quantifying the levels of background radio interference at such 
locations in order to develop required immunity specifications for radio controlled equipment. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The electricity supply industry has recently embarked 
on implementation of radio control into their 
maintenance and construction vehicles. These 
vehicles, primarily Elevating Work Platforms (EWP), 
are used extensively by electricity utilities for many 
routine operations, including maintenance and repair 
of live overhead power lines. EWP units have 
historically been operated using hydraulic controls and 
actuators. In a direct attempt to increase the effective 
electrical isolation levels of vehicle components these 
controls are now being replaced with radio control. 
 
Hydraulic control lines within EWP booms are prone 
to gradual build up of contaminants (dirt, oil, etc.), 
which increase the possibility of current tracking if 
any component of the EWP comes in contact with live 
overhead lines. This compromises the insulation 
integrity of the boom. Replacement of hydraulic 
controls with radio control units allows the number of 
hydraulic control lines within the boom to be reduced 
and thus lessen the build up of contaminants. 
 
Radio control operation of EWP units also allows the 
introduction of a remote operator to take control of the 
EWP movements in emergency situations, with near 
immediate transfer of control in circumstances when 
required. In addition, if remote ground operators are 
able to utilise a radio controller, it eliminates the need 
for them to approach a potentially live chassis in an 
emergency where the EWP has come in contact with 
live overhead lines. While the introduction of EWP 
radio control units is already being undertaken, 
manufacturers of the radio control units seem 
unwilling to guarantee their operation in the 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) environment that 
exists in close proximity to live overhead lines. 
 
The range of environmental variables associated with 
possible detrimental effects on the radio control that 
were of concern for this study include close proximity 
to large magnitude 50Hz voltages and currents, radio 
frequency interference initiated by transient over 
voltages from lightning and distribution system circuit 
switching operations, radio transmissions from other 
nearby devices, and the required range available to the 
radio control units. This paper covers two aspects of 
the security of EWP radio control unit operation: 
(i) Interference from external sources emitting radio 
frequency emissions, and 
(ii) The effects of electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) from live overhead lines. 
 
2. Elevating work platform security of operation 
 
The main concern for electricity utilities is the safety 
of EWP operating personnel and the public. Operator 
safety issues include environmental factors (especially 
during storm conditions and wet weather when crews 
are at their most active), integrity of hydraulic 
systems, electrical insulation including inadvertent 
contact with live conductors and contamination issues, 
fire and adequate staff training. Various codes and 
standards [1, 2] have been developed to address these 
concerns in regards to EWPs. A recent paper [3] 
describes the above mentioned issues and the 
proposed changes to the relevant Australian Standard 
[4]. These changes are intended to improve operator 
and public safety. However, radio control 
specifications and immunity requirements are not 
expressly dealt with in these codes and standards. 
 
There have been some isolated cases of incidents 
involving EWP units whereby the operator has not 
been able to operate the hydraulic controls from 
within the bucket of the EWP unit due to 
incapacitation. In these cases a remote operator has 
had to board the EWP vehicle and descend the boom 
using the remote controls on the EWP vehicle. There 
have also been incidents whereby the boom has come 
into contact with live lines to the point where the EWP 
vehicle becomes live and fault current to earth is 
initiated (see Figure 1). A combination of these two 
types of incidents would be a suitable argument for 
establishing a remote operator away from the vehicle 
using a radio control unit. 
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Figure 1: Sketch of EWP operating close to 
overhead power lines and nearby trees 
 
3. Elevating work platform radio control 
 
Radio controls for EWP units are usually modular 
units that can be configured for cranes, vehicles, or 
any industrial machinery. The number and complexity 
of controls can thus be configured to match just about 
any application. For the EWP units the radio control 
transmitter devices are fitted with weather protected 
joysticks, an emergency stop push button, control 
indication, power on/off push buttons, key operated 
lockout switch, and channel selection switches (if 
available). The receiver units are designed to operate 
the hydraulics of the EWP via control valves. 
 
A typical range for a remote operator of an EWP is 
approximately 20m. This ensures sufficient distance 
for isolation from a potentially live vehicle chassis. 
The required range of operation will vary across work 
sites. The radio controllers should be able to operate 
without malfunction up to 50m from the vehicle. A 
range of 100m is specified by most equipment 
suppliers [5]. It is proposed that the remote operator 
would only operate the bucket and boom in a situation 
whereby the main operator (in the bucket) has become 
incapacitated or there is a danger of loss of control. 
 
3.1 Interference from other wireless devices 
 
The typical operating frequency bandwidth of the 
radio control units and similar units available overseas 
is specified as being selectable within the range of 400 
to 500MHz. The specific operating frequency band 
used by most EWP radio controls in Australia is 433 
to 434MHz. This operating frequency allows the radio 
control units to be operated unlicensed within 
Australia provided the radio frequency power output 
is below 25mW and the duty cycle of operation is less 
than 10% [6]. There are similar requirements for such 
devices operating within Europe [7]. 
 
Other wireless devices also using the 433 to 434MHz 
band in Australia that may be of concern to the 
operation of the EWP radio control units from an 
interference perspective include: 
• Wireless controlled video, high definition cameras, 
• Wireless door openers, 
• Wireless amplifier-loud speaker combinations and 
wireless headphones, 
• Medical sensors (range of up to 1km), and 
• Wireless alarm systems (range of 100 to 300m). 
 
On the market there are high power transmitters 
available for wireless transmission used in telemetry, 
telecontrol and remote monitoring equipment with 
output power up to 1000mW. UHF transceivers are 
also available at similar frequencies with emitted 
power of 500 to 5000mW and a range of up to 50kms. 
Bucket 
Boom 
Receiver  
Spectral leakage from nearby frequency bands may 
also contribute to interference. Devices that have 
significant power output levels and operating at 
nearby frequency bands include: 
• Trunk radio 
• Household radio modems (range up to 1.5km) 
• Older digital phone networks 
• Remote car door and garage units 
• Radio controlled cars (difficult to control use of) 
 
To assist with the security of operation (interference 
immunity), the more complex EWP radio control units 
have a number of channels available using FM narrow 
bandwidth modulation. Typically 8 to 32 channels will 
be available and selection can be either manual or 
automatic. Automatic control of channel selection 
allows the unit to be switched to an alternative 
bandwidth if interference from an external source 
becomes significant. It is noted however that the 
bands for the various channels are not separated by a 
large expanse of frequencies, usually 12.5kHz to 
50kHz, and interference from one or more of the 
above mentioned devices may indeed ‘black out’ a 
number of available channels. 
 
To ensure that similar units do not interfere with each 
other, the manufacturers provide address encoding. 
Some manufacturers specify up to 20 bits encoding for 
addresses (over 1,000,000 separate addresses). CRC 
error encoding or a similar alternative is also provided 
with the transmitter signals to ensure commands are 
received correctly by the receiver unit. 
 
3.2 Interference from electrical disturbances 
 
Live overhead powerlines will generally only produce 
significant electromagnetic fields at frequencies at or 
near the nominal power frequency, i.e. 50Hz. If 
electrical disturbances exist on the power lines that 
comprise of components of frequencies other than the 
nominal system frequencies, electromagnetic fields 
will also be produced at the component frequencies. 
Low frequency power quality disturbances such as 
harmonic distortion, voltage fluctuations, frequency 
deviations, voltage sags and swells, momentary 
interruptions, notching, and unbalance all occur at 
frequencies well below the operating frequency of the 
EWP radio control units. 
 
High frequency power quality disturbances such as 
impulsive and oscillatory transients may contribute to 
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significant radio communication interference [8]. 
These high frequency power system phenomena can 
arise due to lightning strikes, switching events, or 
system fault conditions. High frequency oscillatory 
transients can occur during back to back switching of 
capacitor banks, however frequencies typically remain 
below 0.5MHz [9]. Fault conditions that excite the 
natural response of the system can create significant 
oscillatory transients of the order of 1-5MHz 
depending on the system configuration and location of 
fault. This brings oscillatory transients into the range 
of HF radio communication devices. 
 
Lightning strokes exist for only 50 to 100µs, and these 
may be multiple return strokes within a period of 1 
second [8]. Although capturing of current and voltage 
waveforms due to lightning strikes is difficult, it is 
generally accepted that initial rise times of 
approximately 0.5-1.5µs are typical [10]. Thus most of 
the energy associated with lightning strikes will be 
concentrated at frequencies less than 1MHz. There is a 
small amount of energy above this frequency and 
indeed down to dc. Significant interference due to 
lightning strikes can thus occur for HF and lower 
range VHF radio communication devices. 
 
Arcing, or gap type discharge, and the effects of 
corona discharge have been reported to exist at 
significant levels on HV and EHV systems for 
frequencies up to 100MHz. Beyond this frequency the 
strength of the RF interference created drops off at a 
rapid rate [11, 12]. Although not of primary concern it 
is possible that electromagnetic interference from 
inductive coupling paths may have an effect on the 
security of operation of the EWP radio control system. 
 
4 Field measurements of interference 
 
Levels of interference due to overhead power lines are 
rarely reported above 100MHz [12-14]. In [13] 
significant interference fields were found around the 
proximity of faulty equipment, switches and 
insulators. The randomness of interference effects 
combined with the high resolution required to measure 
effects at frequencies above 1MHz ensures field 
measurements are difficult. 
 
Field measurements of background radio frequency 
interference for this study were undertaken at various 
locations within the customer base areas of TransGrid, 
Integral Energy and EnergyAustralia. The purpose of 
coordinated field measurements was to determine if 
any significant background radio frequency 
interference levels existed at frequencies utilised by 
EWP radio controller units near typical working 
locations.  
 
The locations identified for measurements included 
those in close proximity to overhead power lines, 
substations, and locations adjacent to customer 
installations. Sites with suspected high probability of 
background interference that were proposed for the 
study are listed in Table I. 
 
Table I: Field measurement sites 
Site Description 
1. 500kV Substation 
2. 330kV Substation 
3. 132kV Substation  
4. 66kV overhead feeder 
5. 33kV overhead feeders 
6. 11kV overhead feeder 
7. Utility workshop and depot 
8. Remote control aeroplane airfield 
9. Digital television and communication towers 
10. Mobile phone tower 
11. Hospital and radiology unit 
12. Shopping centre 
13. Office complex 
14. Computer laboratory 
15. HV DC lines at a Railway Station 
 
Antenna 
Aluminium
Ground 
Plane
PVC 
Conduit 
Coaxial 
Cable 
Antenna                 Spectrum        Laptop 
   Base                    Analyser       Computer  
Figure 2: Field measurement test setup 
 
4.1 Measurement procedure 
 
Background radio frequency interference levels were 
obtained to establish test limits for operation of the 
EWP radio controller units. Measurement of 
background radio interference levels was completed 
using a handheld spectrum analyser, high bandwidth 
antenna developed for the project, and computer for 
data storage and analysis. The field measurement test 
setup is illustrated in Figure 2. Measurements were 
completed with the antenna and spectrum analyser 
located immediately adjacent to the live overhead 
lines where possible. At some locations access was 
limited and thus measurements had to be taken at 
distances of up to 5 to 10 metres from overhead lines 
and other sources. 
 
To ensure the radio frequency emissions from arcing 
were captured (i.e. to emulate corona discharge, 
surface discharge, etc.), at numerous sites the arcing 
was synthetically created by contacting the live 
overhead lines with insulated testing poles. This was 
completed from the EWP bucket at a distance of 1 to 2 
metres from the lines and from ground level at various 
locations. 
 
 3
Robinson, Wysocki, Smith & Popovski in 4th Workshop on the Internet, Telecommunications and Signal Processing (2005)
4 2 5 4 3 0 4 3 5 4 4 0 4 4 5 4 5 0 4 5 5
- 8 0
- 7 5
- 7 0
- 6 5
- 6 0
- 5 5
- 5 0
M a x i m u m  S p e c t r a l  E m i s s i o n s  f o r  4 2 5  t o  4 5 5  M H z  R a n g e
F r e q u e n c y  ( M H z )
M
ax
im
um
 E
m
is
si
on
 (d
B)
43
3 
to
 4
35
 M
H
z 
Figure 3: Maximum level of background interference for frequency range 425 to 455MHz 
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Figure 4: Maximum level of background interference for frequency range 400 to 480MHz 
Three sets of measurements were obtained at each of 
the sites listed in Table I. Each set of measurements 
was obtained using the maximum peak hold function 
of the spectrum analyser. The three sets of 
measurements were: 
(i) 425 to 455MHz sweep to identify interference 
equivalent to or adjacent to operating frequency 
of the EWP radio control units. 
(ii) 400 to 480MHz sweep to identify interference 
adjacent to operating frequency of the EWP 
radio control units which may have spectral 
leakage into radio control unit signals. 
(iii) 0 to 400MHz sweep to identify interference at 
lower frequencies to investigate the assumption 
that interference from live overhead lines will be 
at the lower end of the frequency spectrum. 
 
4.2 Background interference levels 
 
The first set of measurements obtained at each site 
was of the maximum recorded samples of background 
interference in the frequency range 425 to 455MHz. 
Figure 3 illustrates the overall maximum background 
interference levels across all sites obtained within this 
bandwidth. The spikes of background interference 
within the bandwidth were identified at the various 
sites including: 500kV substation, 330kV substation, 
and adjacent to telecommunication towers. 
 
In Figure 3 it can be seen that the background radio 
frequency interference levels are greater at other 
frequencies than within the 433 to 435MHz range of 
interest. However, the possibility of spectral leakage 
from neighbouring frequencies and the inevitable use 
of devices not captured during these specific field 
measurements suggests the eventual immunity level 
(i.e. the background interference levels which will not 
affect the EWP radio controller unit) should be 
specified above the values within 433 to 435MHz. As 
other frequency bandwidths outside this narrow 
bandwidth may also be utilised by some types of EWP 
radio controller units, immunity levels may be 
required to include other bandwidths within the 425 to 
455MHz range. This is an area that requires further 
ongoing investigation as new EWP radio controller 
units are introduced onto the market. 
 
The second set of field measurements was a repeat of 
the first test with a broader frequency sweep of 400 to 
480MHz. As the same number of sample frequency 
points are utilised by the spectrum analyser there is 
some lost resolution in completing frequency sweeps 
over the wider range, and thus results become 
indicative. Sufficient resolution is retained to identify 
major background interference that may have an affect 
on EWP radio controller units. Figure 4 illustrates the 
maximum background interference levels obtained 
over all sites within 400 to 480MHz. 
 
Some of the peak magnitudes identified in Figure 3 
are also present in the Figure 4, even with the reduced 
resolution settings of the spectrum analyser. As 
illustrated in Figure 4 significant background levels 
exist both above and below that of the frequencies 
utilised by the EWP radio control units. The spikes of 
background interference within the 400 to 480MHz 
bandwidth of Figure 4 were obtained at various sites 
including; the railway station, the 500kV substation, 
and adjacent to hospital and mobile phone tower sites. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the sweep of frequencies from the 
lower range of the spectrum analyser, i.e. 100kHz, up 
to that of previous sweeps. As suspected there is much 
greater levels of background radio frequency 
interference at lower frequencies. This was general to 
all sites from which field measurements were 
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Figure 5: Maximum level of background interference for frequency range 0 to 400 MHz 
obtained, and especially those immediately adjacent to 
live overhead lines. This aligns with the evidence 
from [15] that in general significant radio frequency 
interference from live overhead power lines will be 
limited to frequencies below 200MHz. 
 
The background interference levels from Figure 3 can 
be compared with the EWP radio control unit 
transmitter output measured by the spectrum analyser 
at various ranges as shown in Figure 6. Only at close 
proximity is the transmitter output signal level above 
that of the measured maximum background 
interference levels. It is noted that the maximum 
interference levels measured may only exist for short 
periods of time, as the maximum hold function was 
used with multiple sweeps of the bandwidth of 
interest. The probability of the maximum background 
level and command signal of the EWP radio controller 
existing at the same time may be quite small in most 
cases. However, it does identify the possibility of 
significant interference existing at some sites. 
 
4.3 Specification of interference immunity 
 
It is proposed that the background radio frequency 
interference levels of Figure 3 immediately adjacent to 
434MHz be used to determine the minimum test limits 
for specification of EWP radio controller immunity. 
Incorporating the neighbouring peaks of background 
interference suggests a level of approximately –70dB 
(-40dBm) should be used as the required immunity 
level. A small allowance is given for interference 
sources not identified in the field measurements. Note 
that the specified test limit appears uniform for 
practicality of implementation rather than varying 
over the frequency range in a similar manner to that of 
measured values. 
 
5 Laboratory measurements 
 
Laboratory testing of a sample EWP radio controller 
was undertaken as part of the investigation into EWP 
radio controller security. The laboratory tests included 
a comparative calibration of the equipment used to 
obtain field measurements with laboratory equipment, 
determination of the operating range of radio control 
units, and establishment of background radio 
frequency interference levels which produce 
significant errors at the EWP radio controller receiver. 
 
A single EWP radio controller unit on loan from a 
representative supplier was used for all the laboratory 
tests. No comparative tests have been undertaken 
using EWP radio controller units from other 
manufacturers/suppliers. 
 
5.1 Field measurement equipment performance 
 
To establish the performance of the antenna developed 
for the field measurements, the reflection coefficient 
of the antenna was determined using a laboratory 
network analyser. The reflection coefficient measured 
was approximately 6.3dB at 434MHz, illustrating 
minimal losses, and therefore satisfactory performance 
of the antenna. 
 
The coaxial cable connecting the laboratory network 
analyser with the antenna had measured attenuation of 
0.2 dB at 434 MHz. This is also to be included in the 
power losses of the entire antenna configuration. 
 
5.2 Radio controller unit under test 
 
The sample EWP radio controller unit under test 
consisted of a transmitter and receiver unit. The 
receiver unit had four LEDs which indicated the status 
of the signal transmissions, allowing indication of 
valid data being received, emergency stop activation, 
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Figure 6: Magnitude of EWP transmitter signal compared to background interference 
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power on and off, and establishment of an operational 
error condition (excessive signal error or internal 
circuitry error). 
 
 
1 
m
 EWP 
Transmitter 
Distance (d) 
EWP 
Receiver 
Network 
Analyser 
 
Figure 7: EWP and laboratory equipment set up 
 
rors 
Distanc 3 (dB) 
To establish the working range of the EWP radio 
control unit testing of the transmitter signal 
attenuation over various distances was undertaken. 
This involved measurement of the transmitter signal 
power over distances of 5m to 30m. Results of these 
tests are presented in Figure 6. The laboratory setup 
for the attenuation measurements is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 7. The EWP radio control unit 
receiver and broadband antenna were placed at a 
distance 1 m apart, while the transmitter unit was 
operated at increasing distances perpendicular to the 
midpoint of the receiver and antenna. The antenna was 
connected to the laboratory network analyser via the 
same coaxial cable used for field measurements. 
 
Table II: Interference signal levels at which er
(LED indication) were established 
e (m) Test 1 (dB) Test 2 (dB) Test 
5 No errors No errors No errors 
10 No errors No errors No errors 
15 -52.16 -36.36 No errors 
20 -56.66 -54.56 -35.66 
25 -52.36 -40.36 -35.36 
30 -55.76 -43.06 -45.46 
 
he setup in Figu also  to d ine 
sions 
f background radio frequency 
T re 7 was  utilised eterm
the immunity levels of the EWP radio control receiver 
unit. This was achieved by using the network analyser 
as a ‘white noise’ interference source by increasing 
the magnitude of interference until the receiver 
signalled erroneous transmissions. The results of these 
jamming test are summarised in Table II. The sample 
EWP radio control unit provided immunity above that 
of the -70dB suggested as a suitable immunity level in 
Section 4.3. 
 
 Conclu6
 
eld measurements oFi
interference at operating locations of radio controlled 
vehicles used by the electricity industry have been 
undertaken. Results suggest that it is unlikely that 
significant levels of electromagnetic interference 
derived from the currents and voltages existing on live 
overhead power lines will occur at frequencies within 
the 400 to 500MHz frequency band used by the radio 
control units. Further measurements are required at 
each site to establish variations in background levels 
over periods of time and to also allow improved 
statistical analysis to be performed on the results. 
 
The frequency band selected for the operation of the 
elevating work platform radio control units is of some 
concern as this frequency band is shared by a 
significant number of unlicensed users at various 
operating power levels and duty cycles. It is perceived 
that this frequency band will only become more 
crowded as Australia adopts similar allocations of 
frequencies as is currently being adopted in Europe. A 
proposed immunity level to such interference has been 
established. 
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